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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Starting from Auty (1993), the resource curse denotes the negative effect of natural capital endow-
ments on social and economic outcomes observed in many resource- rich countries.1 Although there is 
an extensive theoretical and empirical literature that evidences that negative impact, the existence of a 
resource curse is not unanimously supported.2 In this regard, past findings on political regimes do not 
represent an exception.
1For comprehensive reviews on the resource curse and its causes and consequences, see van der Ploeg (2011) and Ross (2015). 
2Much of the literature argues that natural resource abundance leads to lower economic growth rates (e.g., Gylfason, 2001), a 
higher level of corruption (e.g., Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2013), and civil conflicts (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). However, these results have been contradicted more recently (e.g., Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; Cotet & Tsui, 2013; Haber 
& Menaldo, 2011). 
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This paper evaluates the existence of a resource curse on 
political regimes using the Synthetic Control Method. 
Focusing on 12 countries, we compare their democracy 
level with the weighted democracy level of countries that 
have not experienced oil shocks and have similar pre- event 
characteristics. We find that the exogenous variation in oil 
endowment does not have the same effect on all countries. 
In most cases, the event has a negative effect in the long run, 
but countries with a pre- existing high level of democracy 
are not negatively affected.
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The lack of consensus on the existence of a resource curse may be due to the econometric tech-
niques applied, the choice of natural resource indicators, or the neglected heterogeneity across coun-
tries. Indeed, many of the previous studies suffers from omitted variables and endogeneity of the 
variables capturing natural resource endowment. However, a growing number of papers tries to settle 
the controversy claiming that natural resources may be a curse or a blessing depending on the quality 
of institutions.
We contribute to this strand of the literature by providing empirical evidence for the heterogeneity 
in the effect of natural resources on political institutions and, more precisely, on the democracy level 
of oil- rich countries. As stated by Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006: 451), “For every Venezuela 
and Nigeria, there is a Norway or a Botswana,” thus, average effects presented in previous studies may 
hide substantial differences in the response of natural resources. Following Tsui (2011), we consider 
when oil discoveries reach the peak as an exogenous shock that may have heterogeneous effects on 
political regimes. The peak is defined as the point in time after which the rate of oilfield discoveries 
begins to decline.3
Our hypothesis is that, after the peak of oil discoveries, which indicates a potential decrease in 
 resource endowment, incumbents may enforce higher entry barriers to exploit the remaining re-
sources, thereby deteriorating the quality of political institutions. However, they may be constrained 
in pursuing this strategy by the existence of democratic institutions. Thus, countries that have a high 
level of democracy before the peak of oil discoveries may not be negatively affected by this event.
We find, indeed, that the relationship between oil discoveries and democracy is non- linear, and our 
insight is that it depends on the initial level of democracy itself. In countries like India and Colombia, 
which had reached high levels of democracy before experiencing the peak of oil discoveries, there 
are no significant changes after this event. All other countries, apart from Gabon where a period of 
political reforms took place after the peak of oil discoveries, were negatively affected by the variation 
in oil endowment. This effect is sizable, since, on average, the level of democracy in countries that 
experienced the peak of oil discoveries is 8% lower than the counterfactual outcome. Our findings 
are in line with the literature suggesting that the effect of natural resources depends on the quality of 
institutions (e.g., Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006; Robinson et al., 2006).
On the methodological side, we perform a data- driven analysis that compares the actual outcomes 
of each resource- rich country with the counterfactual in the absence of a natural resource shock, rather 
than calculate the average effect of natural resources across countries. More specifically, we apply 
the synthetic control method (SCM), developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended in 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). The SCM has some notable advantages. First, it is ideally 
suited to investigate the heterogeneous response to rare events, which is the main objective of this 
paper. Moreover, with this method, we can trace the path of our outcome variable over time, thereby 
providing an evaluation of the dynamics of the effect after the shock. Then, it improves on other 
econometric methods for impact evaluation by controlling for both observed and time- varying unob-
served effects. Finally, the SCM has the added advantage of transparency, since it explicitly shows the 
relative contribution of each country to estimate the counterfactual outcome, as well as rigor, given 
that the set of potential controls are appropriately restricted to make the underlying country compar-
isons more reasonable.
3As in Tsui (2011), we argue that the timing and size of oil discovery are possibly more exogenous than oil production or ex-
ports. Moreover, the peak of discoveries suffers less from endogeneity issues than the initial discovery of oil, as it depends more 
on geological factors than on exploration. Nevertheless, we tackle endogeneity concerns in section 4. Moreover, we test the 
effect of the first discovery in section 6. 
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on natural resources and political 
regimes; section 3 presents the methodology; in section 4 data and some tests on exogeneity are intro-
duced. Section 5 shows the results, whereas robustness checks are presented in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes.
2 |  NATURAL RESOURCES AND POLITICAL REGIMES
The impact of oil wealth on democracies is ambiguous. A number of studies claim that oil has pro-
democratic effects in democracies, because it makes governments more stable (reducing the likeli-
hood of a transition to autocracy) or improves democracy scores (Brückner, Ciccone, & Tesei, 2012; 
Smith, 2004; Tsui, 2011). A second group of studies finds no evidence that oil helps to stabilize 
democratic regimes (e.g., Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Naghavi and Bjorvatn, 2011) or not promote 
dictatorship over the long run (Haber & Menaldo, 2011). In contrast, Crespo Cuaresma, Oberhofer, 
and Raschky (2011) show that oil increases the duration of dictatorships, enhancing their stability.
The most common argument linking more oil to less democracy is the rentier effect: an abundant 
flow of oil revenues enables incumbents to reduce taxes and/or increase patronage and public goods, 
making it possible for them to buy off a larger set of potential challengers and reduce dissent (Ross, 
2001). Moreover, higher non- tax revenues allow autocrats to reduce taxation and attenuate demands 
for greater accountability that would emerge from the imposition of heavier taxes or reduced subsidies 
(Brautigam, Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008). In the rentier model, resource wealth does not affect the pref-
erences of rulers, but it does influence their ability to act on these preferences. Robinson et al. (2006) 
and Caselli and Cunningham (2009) claim that higher resources increase the value leaders place on 
remaining in office because resource rents make incumbency more valuable, inducing a ruler to invest 
more in regime- preserving activities.4
A more recent strand of the literature suggests that the effect of oil on democratic stability is condi-
tional: it may stabilize democracies that are wealthy and have strong institutions but foster the break-
down of accountability in poorer democracies or ones with weaker institutions (e.g., Ross, 2012). 
According to Robinson et al. (2006), politicians tend to over- extract natural resources because they 
overly discount the future, thereby increasing resource misallocation in the economy. Countries with 
institutions that promote accountability and competence tend to benefit from resource booms, as these 
institutions reduce the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Thus, the quality of insti-
tutions determines whether countries avoid the resource curse (Mehlum et al., 2006). Taken together, 
these results conflict with Sachs and Warner's (1999) claim that institutions are irrelevant for the 
resource curse.
Empirical evidence for the political resource curse has focused mainly on the use of panel data, 
and the quality of institutions has often been proxied by corruption. The link goes from resource 
availability to corruption and rent- seeking via protection, exclusive licences to exploit and export re-
sources given by the political elite to oligarchs in order to capture wealth and political power. Resource 
dependence is indeed strongly associated with a worse corruption perception index, which in turn 
is associated with lower growth (Mauro, 1995), and natural resource wealth stimulates corruption 
among bureaucrats and politicians (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). According to Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010), natural resources induce corruption in countries that have been in a non- democratic regime 
4Caselli and Michaels (2013) argue that the reason why oil windfalls translate into little improvement in the provision of public 
goods or the population's living standards lies on a combination of patronage/rent sharing and embezzlement by top municipal 
officials. 
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for more than 60 per cent of the years since 1956. Along the same lines, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) 
claim that high natural resource rents and open democratic systems slow growth in the absence of 
sufficient checks and balances.
A new line of empirical research involves quasi- experimental studies. Vicente (2010) compares 
changes in perceived corruption in São Tomé, which announced a significant oil discovery in 1997–
1999, with those in Cape Verde, with no oil. The two locations have a similar history, culture, and 
political institutions. He finds that corruption increased by almost 10 per cent after the announcement 
of the oil discovery and decreased slightly thereafter. In a regression- discontinuity study not explicitly 
related to natural resources, Brollo et al. (2013) find that windfall government revenues in Brazilian 
municipalities increase corruption and strengthen incumbency, but adversely affect the quality of 
politicians.
As far as the variables related to natural resources are concerned, a limited number of papers uses 
oil discoveries rather than oil endowment or production (Arezki, Ramey, & Sheng, 2017; Cotet & 
Tsui, 2013; Lei & Michaels, 2014; Tsui, 2011).5 Tsui (2011) argues that oil production, the typical 
measure of natural resource abundance, is noisy. Owing to geological constraints, the production rate 
is non- monotonic over the lifecycle of an oilfield; therefore, production is not a good indicator of the 
remaining reserves and oil wealth (the capital value of future oil rent, and hence a stock variable). 
Moreover, production understates the oil wealth of swing producers who produce below their capacity. 
Oil exploration involves high risks: with the current technology, the success rate of exploration is still 
below 50 per cent, and historically has been much lower (Cotet & Tsui, 2013). It is therefore plausible 
to treat oil discoveries as positive oil shocks, the timing and size of which are more exogenous than oil 
production. Furthermore, the size of the deposit, quality, and other cost- determining characteristics 
are exogenous.6
Using an empirical strategy based on an instrumental variables approach, Tsui (2011) finds that 
larger oil discoveries cause slower transitions to democracy; however, there is no such effect in demo-
cratic countries.7 This is positively correlated with oil quality and negatively correlated with exploration 
and extraction costs. Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Lei and Michaels (2014) explore the impact of oil dis-
coveries and civil conflicts, finding opposite results. While Cotet and Tsui (2013) find little robust evi-
dence that oil discoveries increase the likelihood of political violence, but they increase military spending 
in non- democratic countries, Lei and Michaels (2014) show that giant oilfield discoveries increase the 
incidence of internal armed conflicts by about 5–8 percent within 4–8 years of discovery. Moreover, they 
show that, controlling for country and time fixed effects, the timing of giant oilfield discoveries is plau-
sibly exogenous, at least in the short- medium run. Finally, Arezki et al. (2017) examine the effect of news 
about oil and gas discoveries on macroeconomic variables, finding that the current account and saving 
5There are considerable differences between their approaches. First, Tsui (2011) and Cotet and Tsui (2013) includes only oil 
discoveries, whereas Lei and Michaels (2014), and Arezki et al. (2017) also include natural gas and condensate. Second, the 
first two papers aggregate reserves from all discoveries within a country in a given peak year (that marks the peak of oil discov-
eries), whereas the others use only the largest individual discovery. According to Lei and Michaels (2014), the correlation be-
tween their indicator for giant oilfield discoveries and the indicator used by Cotet and Tsui (2013) is around 0.55. 
6In contrast, there is empirical evidence that bad political conditions lead to less oil exploration and production (Bohn & 
Deacon, 2000; Cust & Harding, 2014; Ross, 2012). Hence, oil levels tend to be biased downward in countries with less democ-
racy and more conflict, reducing the risk of positive bias. 
7For comparability, as in Tsui (2011),we consider the year of the peak of oil discoveries for our before- and- after comparison 
but we take a fundamentally different approach. His method produces average effects of oil discoveries on the level of democ-
racy, whereas ours gives the effect in each treated country. Therefore, his approach is more general but conceals differences 
across countries. Our methodology returns the country- specific effect at the cost of concentrating on a few cases. The ap-
proaches are complementary. 
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rate decline for the first 5 years after the announcements of giant oil discoveries and then rise sharply 
during the ensuing years; investment rises soon after the news arrives, whereas GDP starts to increase 
5 years after; and employment rates fall slightly and remain low for a sustained period.
Summarizing, the previous literature fails to derive clear- cut effects of natural resources on polit-
ical regimes, mainly because of the difficulty in the identification of relevant measures and suitable 
counterfactuals. Thus, although the existing large number of studies concerning the resource curse, 
different empirical strategies are crucial. The next section presents our approach. To the best of our 
knowledge, only Mideksa (2013) and Smith (2015) apply the SCM in the analysis of the resource 
curse. However, both consider the impact of resource discoveries on GDP per capita and do not eval-
uate the political consequences of natural resource shocks.
3 |  THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL APPROACH
The SCM provides quantitative inference in small- sample comparative studies by estimating the 
counterfactual situation of one or more aggregate entity in the absence of an event or intervention 
(Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010). The missing counterfactual outcome is given by 
the weighted outcome of all potential comparison units that best reproduces the characteristics of the 
case under examination (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2015). In our case, we compare the level 
of democracy in countries with a peak of oil discoveries with the weighted democracy level of coun-
tries where the peak of oil discoveries has not been reached but with similar pre- event characteristics.
To frame the SCM in the context of this study, assume that there is a balanced panel of I + 1 coun-
tries indexed by i and observed over T years. Among these, country i = 1 (treated unit) reaches the 
peak of oil discoveries at time T0 < T; the remaining I countries are not affected by giant oil discover-
ies (donor pool). The effect of the event is given by:
where t > T0, Y1t is the observed outcome of country i = 1 for a postevent period t, and YN1t is the un-
observable potential outcome of country i = 1, that is, the democracy level that would have been ob-
served in the absence of the event. The SCM estimates YN
1t
 by defining a weighted average of the donor 
pool (synthetic control). The estimator of α1 at time t is given by the difference between the outcome 
of the treated unit and the outcome of the synthetic control at that period:
The weights w∗
i
 are chosen such that the characteristics (predictors) of the treated unit are best re-
produced by the characteristics of the synthetic control. More formally, let X1k be the pre- event value 
of the kth democracy predictor for the treated unit, and let X0k be a (1 × I) vector of the pre- event val-
ues of the same variable kth for the units in the donor pool. Then, the vector W* containing the weights 
assigned to each control unit is chosen in order to minimize the following sum:
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we choose the positive semidefinite and diagonal matrix V using the data- driven procedure imple-
mented by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010): V minimizes the mean squared 
prediction error (MSPE) of the outcome variable in the pre- event period. MSPE measures the ex-
pected squared distance between the outcome of the treated unit and the outcome of the synthetic 
control in the pre- event period.8 Thus, the lower the MSPE, the more the synthetic control resem-
bles the characteristic of the treated unit. To achieve lower MSPE, we implement the nested optimi-
zation procedure that searches all V matrices and sets of W weights for the best fitting convex 
combination of the units in the donor pool. Moreover, to ensure that the global minimum in the 
parameter space has been found, the nested optimization is run using three different starting points 
of V: the regression- based V, the equal V weights, and a third procedure that uses the Stata maxi-
mum likelihood search. This procedure is implemented by the Stata module synth (Abadie, Diamond, 
& Hainmueller, 2011).
This data- driven procedure reduces discretion in the choice of the comparison units and has the 
advantage of transparency by making the relative contribution of each unit in the donor pool to the 
counterfactual outcome explicit. In addition, the SCM allows the unobserved variables affecting the 
outcome to change over time. Indeed, when there is a large number of pre- event periods, only those 
units that are similar in both observed and unobserved characteristics should produce similar paths for 
the outcome under scrutiny. Therefore, if the trajectories of the democracy level of the treated unit and 
the synthetic control are alike over numerous years prior to the peak in oil discoveries, a divergence 
in the outcome variable in the following years should be interpreted as produced by the peak itself.
These conclusions cannot be validated by the traditional modes of statistical inference because of the 
small- sample nature of the data. However, Abadie et al. (2010) provide an alternative model of inference 
defined as placebo studies based on the premise that the impact of the event under analysis would be 
undermined if an estimated effect of similar or greater magnitude were obtained in cases where the inter-
vention did not take place. In particular, placebo studies apply the SCM to every country in the pool of po-
tential controls. This aims to assess whether the estimated effect for the treated country is large compared 
to the effect in a country chosen at random. In this study, in-space placebo tests are used to compare the 
estimated treatment effect for each country that reaches the peak of oil discoveries with all the (fake) treat-
ment effects of the control countries, obtained from experiments where each control country is assumed to 
be affected by the same event in the same year as the treated country. If the estimated effect in that country 
is larger than most of the effects obtained by the (fake) experiments, it can safely be concluded that the 
baseline results are not driven by chance. This means that if the path of the postevent level of democracy 
in our case studies falls well outside the distribution of placebo effects, we attribute that effect to the peak 
of oil discoveries.
4 |  DEMOCRACY, PREDICTORS, AND EVENT PERIODS
We measure the level of democracy using the polity2 indicator from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, 
Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014), which provides a 21- point scale ranging from −10 (hereditary monarchy) to 
+10 (consolidated democracy). To scale down the variance, we transform the variable to lie between 
0 and 1, with one corresponding to the highest level of democracy.
The set of predictors includes factors the literature identifies as determinants of democracy. We 
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GDP per capita (Gdp). We also include a set of additional variables related to economic development 
that may predict a country's democratic level (see Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Barro, 1999; Lipset, 
1959): the index of human capital (Human capital); the sum of imports and exports over GDP 
(Openness); and the value added by the mining,9 manufacturing, and primary sectors as a percentage 
of GDP (Mining, Manufacturing, Primary). In addition, we consider the hostility level of interstate 
disputes (Hostility), and the total amount of natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP (Total 
rents), to control for the possible effects of both conflicts and natural resource rents. Finally, we in-
clude the average level of democracy calculated in the 10 years preceding the event under scrutiny, to 
capture the quality of pre- existing institutions. Table 1 provides variable definitions, sources, and de-
scriptive statistics.
Following Tsui (2011), we identify the year of the event exploiting the oil production and depletion 
dataset collected by Campbell (2006). This dataset contains information on the peak year of oil dis-
coveries for the top 65 oil- producing countries. We consider that year as the period in which the event 
under scrutiny takes place.10
The predictors are averaged over a 10- year pre- event period, and the path of the outcome variable 
is analyzed until 2014.11 Owing to data availability, we restrict our analysis to developing countries 
9The value added by the mining sector is obtained subtracting manufacturing from the variable “mining, manufacturing, utili-
ties” taken from the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) database. The noise of utilities in the 
measurement of the mining sector is small (Caruso, Costa, & Ricciuti, 2014). 
10See Tsui (2011) for more information on how this dataset is compiled. 
11We also considered longer pretreatment period (results available upon request). However, since the SCM requires no missing 
values in the outcome variable for the entire period of analysis, in some cases, the control group shrank so much that the loss in 
the goodness of pretreatment fit was too high to consider the comparison unit credible. 
T A B L E  2  Peak of oil discoveries: Case studies
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affected by the peak in the 1970s or later.12 Table 2 shows the countries analyzed and the year in which 
they reached the peak of oil discoveries, whereas Table A1 in Appendix S1 lists those countries that 
are excluded. For each treated unit, the donor pool encompasses all the countries not affected by the 
event for which data are available.
One of the key assumptions in the SCM is that the event is exogenous and, thus, its effects are not 
anticipated. We test the validity of this assumption by checking whether the characteristics that predict 
the democracy level are also able to predict the peak of oil discoveries through cross- sectional linear 
regressions.13 The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the country reached the peak of oil discoveries 
after 1970, and 0 otherwise. Predictors are measured at 1970. Table 3 shows the results. All the pre-
dictors are insignificant except for human capital and openness, whose coefficients are both negative 
and significant at the 1 and 10 percent level, respectively. These results may be driven by a non- linear 
relationship between oil discoveries and these variables. Indeed, when we add a squared of them, all 
the coefficients in the multivariate regression become insignificant.14 Another possible explanation is 
that our sample does not include developed countries (such as the UK and Norway) rich in oil and with 
12Angola, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen are excluded because of the lack of pre- event data. Moreover, data 
on total rents, mining, manufacturing, and primary are available from 1970. Hence, the time span over which they are averaged 
is different from the 10- year pre- event period for those countries that reached the peak in the 1970s: Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, 
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Tunisia, and Vietnam. 
13Smith (2015) uses linear regressions to show that oil discoveries do not depend on the initial characteristics that may affect 
future growth. 
14Results are available upon request. 
F I G U R E  1  Path of democracy: Treated countries versus Synthetic controls
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F I G U R E  2  Placebo tests and p- values
(a) (b)
(a) (b)
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a high level of human capital. Nevertheless, this does not invalidate our analysis since the SCM en-
ables countries that have pre- event characteristics dissimilar to the treated unit to be discarded. 
Moreover, even if the effects of the peak are anticipated, the SCM estimates a lower- bound of the true 
effect, given that part of it arises before the event, and provided that the synthetic and the actual out-
come have the same pretreatment trend.
5 |  RESULTS
As highlighted in the previous sections, the credibility of the SCM hinges on its ability to match the 
pre- event outcome of the treated country with that of the synthetic control. Table 4 reports, for each 
case study, the predictor balance, the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE), and the weights 
assigned to the countries included in the synthetic control. Table A2 in Appendix S1 shows the pool 
of potential controls, for each treated country. The low values of the RMSPE confirm the strengths of 
the synthetic control estimator. However, the RMSPE is higher than 0.10 for Malaysia, Pakistan, and 
Thailand. Because such a magnitude is deemed too high for a good fit between the path of the outcome 
variable of the treated unit and its synthetic control, these countries are discarded in the following 
discussion. Graphs are provided in Figure A1 in Appendix S1.
Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of the results by displaying the trajectories of the democ-
racy level in each country and their synthetic counterparts, and Figure A2 in Appendix S1 shows the 
gap between the two.
The main finding is that the achievement of the peak of oil discoveries has heterogeneous effects 
on countries. Most of the case studies present a negative outcome gap in the long run. In particular, 
the level of democracy of Cameroon is slightly lower than the synthetic control after the peak of oil 
discoveries. This negative outcome gap increases considerably 5 years after the event.
The level of democracy in Chad jumps after the peak. However, this is because a civil war started 
in 1979, 2 years after the peak, ending in 1982, and classified with 0 by the Polity score (0.5 according 
to our transformed index). After this period, the country always presents a level of democracy lower 
than the synthetic control.15 The democracy scores of the Republic of Congo and Sudan are slightly 
lower than those of their synthetic controls corresponding with the peak, but are higher for a short 
period after the event (five and 4 years, respectively). Nevertheless, in the long run, in both countries 
the level of democracy is lower than what would have been the case if no peak of oil discoveries had 
occurred. Viet Nam's democracy score is constant during the postevent period, where its counterfac-
tual would have moved towards democracy. Kazakhstan has a negative outcome gap in the pre- event 
period, increasing 2 years after the event, albeit with a low magnitude.
For all these countries, the placebo tests and the implied p- values presented in Figure 2 confirm 
a significant negative effect of oil discoveries on democracy in the decades following the event. In 
contrast, oil discoveries affect the level of democracy in Brazil only in the short run. Indeed, after a 
drop in the level of democracy compared to the synthetic control, Brazil caught up with its counter-
part. Figure 2 proves that the (negative) effect of the peak of oil discoveries is highly significant up to 
10 years after the event.
15Postindependence Chad was plagued by geographical (north vs. south), ethnic (Sara vs. other ethnic groups) and religious 
(Muslims vs. non- Muslims) divides, which brought about two civil wars (1965–1979 and 1979–1982) and a string of coups. 
These conflicts pre- existed the oil discoveries that took place in the South in 1974 and 1977. While in principle we cannot ex-
clude that they exacerbated the existing rivalries, none of the historical literature of we are aware mentioned it as a cause of 
conflict (Azevedo, 1998; Collins & Burns, 2013; Decalo, 1980; Thompson & Adloff, 1981). 
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Mexico and Tunisia do not show clear paths. In both, the peak of oil discoveries seems to halt the 
improvement in democracy that started on the eve of the event. However, the outcome gap is never 
significant, but in Mexico for 3 years after the peak.
In Colombia and India no effects can be devised. Indeed, although the average effect is negative, 
their postevent levels of democracy do not fall well outside the distribution of placebo effects. That is, 
the probability that the detected differences between these countries and their synthetic counterparts 
would occur by chance is higher than the traditional level of significance, confirming that the peak of 
oil discoveries has no effect on democracy in India and Colombia. Interestingly, these were the only 
two countries with a high level of democracy in the pre- event period (>0.9).
Finally, one striking case is Gabon, the only country in which the peak of oil discoveries would 
seem to have had a positive effect on democracy. However, this is misleading because, after the event 
under scrutiny, the political institutions of the country were impacted by another shock in the form of 
violent demonstrations and strikes in the 1990s, leading to political reforms including the transforma-
tion of the political system to a multiparty democracy (Collins & Burns, 2013). These events are not 
captured by the synthetic control, which resembles the characteristics of the treated unit only in the 
absence of further permanent shocks in the outcome.16
Table 5 reports the average polity2 scores and the value of the counterfactual in the same standard 21- 
point scale. In the absence of the peak of oil discovery, Cameroon would have been categorized as a democ-
racy with a polity score of six rather than an anocracy (−4 in the Polity dataset). The Republic of Congo and 
Sudan show a similar strong difference at the end of the period under analysis (7 and 8 points of the polity2 
scale, respectively), and would have obtained democratic characteristics achieving a score between five and 
six in the Polity scale. In a similar fashion Viet Nam, which does not show any change in its Polity level, 
would have improved over time, ending up in the democratic group. The pattern of Tunisia would have 
been similar, starting from a lower level, and ending as an anocracy. In contrast, Kazakhstan would not have 
democratized even in the absence of the peak of oil discoveries reaching a polity2 score of −3.
Gabon has a score below 0 for most of the postpeak period, but it presents a positive difference with its 
counterpart in all the considered periods, with a maximum after 10 years from the peak, when its level of de-
mocracy is 200% higher than that of the synthetic. However, as already mentioned, this result is mainly driven 
by the changes in Gabon's constitution and cannot be ascribed to the variation in oil endowment. Chad, whose 
democracy score is 370% higher than its counterpart 5 years after the peak because of the codification of the 
polity score during civil wars, has been negatively affected in the long run, with a magnitude that ranges from 
30% to 40%. Nevertheless, the country would have classified at most as an open anocracy in the absence of the 
peak of oil discoveries, thus this event did not make much difference for the political situation of the country.
After a 10- point drop of Brazil's democracy level, the country caught up with its counterpart 
10 years after the peak of oil discoveries. This is a nearly unique pattern, similar only to Mexico, 
in which the negative effect is concentrated at the beginning of the period and vanishes over time. 
However, in most cases, the negative effect grows as time goes by.
16Following violent demonstrations and strikes by students and workers, President Bongo organized a conference with opposi-
tion groups in April 1990 that led to the creation of a Senate, decentralization of the budgetary process, freedom of assembly 
and press, and cancelation of the exit visa requirement. A transitional government including representatives of opposition par-
ties was set up. A provisional constitution providing a basic bill of rights and an independent judiciary but retained strong ex-
ecutive powers for the president came into force in March 1991. During this process, in September 1990 two coup attempts 
were uncovered and aborted. In September–October 1990 the first multiparty National Assembly elections in almost 30 years 
took place, with the President's party obtaining a large majority. Following President Bongo's re- election in December 1993, 
opposition candidates refused to validate the election results, and after civil disturbances, an agreement was signed by the 
government and opposition factions to work toward a further political settlement, the Paris Accords of November 1994 
(Mikhailitchenko, 2005). 
   | 21MASI And RICCIUTI
Colombia and India share another distinctive pattern since they consistently score as democracies, 
but the former deteriorates, and the difference with the counterfactual grows over time, whereas the 
latter has a small U- shaped pattern in polity2 with a counterfactual with a higher value starting from t5. 
Nevertheless, in both cases the magnitude of the negative gaps is small and, as already stated, the pla-
cebo tests suggest that the difference between the actual and the synthetic outcome is not significant.
To sum up, countries that reached the peak of oil discoveries with a relatively high level of de-
mocracy are not affected by the decline in democracy itself, whereas existing autocratic regimes are 
strengthened. This is in line with some of the testable hypotheses derived by Caselli and Tesei (2016).
6 |  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
This section includes some robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our main results to changes, 
first, in the measurement of the democracy level, second, in the composition of the control group, and, 
finally, in the event under scrutiny.
T A B L E  5  Average level of polity2 and counterfactual scores after the peak of oil discoveries
Country t5 t10 t15 t20 t25 t30
Brazil −4 −1.2 7.6 8 8 8
Synthetic Brazil 6.0172 6.6844 6.8816 8.0624 8.354 8.5648
Cameroon −7.8 −8 −7.2 −4 −4 −4
Synthetic Cameroon −6.8506 −4.8154 0.558 4.619 5.062 3.0846
Chad −0.6 −5 −6 −3.2 −2 −2
Synthetic Chad −7.9842 −7.6558 −3.4996 1.3578 1.69725 2.777
Colombia 7.8 7 7 7 7 —
Synthetic Colombia 8.9942 8.9744 9.0886 9.261 9.261 —
Republic of Congo −8 1.2 −1.6 −4.6 −4 −4
Synthetic Congo −6.765 −0.3294 −0.25 0.5118 3.84325 4.051
Gabon −8.4 −4 −4 −4 −2.25 3
Synthetic Gabon −8.984 −8.2496 −7.984 −7.9168 −6.472 −6.64
India 7.6 8 8 8 9 9
Synthetic India 8.976 9.2616 9.333 9.714 9.7125 9.4002
Kazakhstan −5.6 −6 −6 — — —
Synthetic Kazakhstan −3.384 −2.985 −2.985 — — —
Mexico −3 −3 0 3.6 7 8
Synthetic Mexico −5.7264 −4.902 2.1622 6.158 6.4925 6.1524
Sudan −5.6 1.4 −7 −7 −6.25 −3.6
Synthetic Sudan −6.185 −3.0838 2.8988 4.088 4.29975 4.2952
Tunisia −9 −8.8 −8 −5 −3.5 −3
Synthetic Tunisia −8.999 −8.8332 −7.103 −3.268 2.189 2.3324
Viet Nam −7 −7 −7 −7 −7 −7
Synthetic Viet Nam −5.348 −5.1956 −3.735 5.142 5.70025 6.1836
Note. Dashes (—) indicate no estimation is available.
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First, we implement the SCM using the Polyarchy dataset compiled by Vanhanen (2014). This 
dataset provides an index of democracy given by the combination of its two most important dimen-
sions: the degree of competition (competition) and the degree of participation (participation). The 
former is measured by the smaller parties’ share of votes in parliamentary or presidential elections, 
and the latter is measured by the percentage of the population that voted in those elections. The com-
bined index of democracy (democracy) is obtained by multiplying the two indicators and dividing 
the product by 100 (Vanhanen, 2000). We estimate the synthetic control using these three variables 
as outcomes. For each indicator, Table 6 sets out the differences between the actual scores and their 
counterfactuals calculated every 5 years after the peak of oil discoveries, whereas graphs and placebo 
tests are available upon request.
The trends in outcome gaps show that the results of the previous analysis are robust. In particular, 
the path of democracy gap almost perfectly replicates the path given by polity2.17 This is not true of 
Kazakhstan, where the average effect is positive until 10 years after the peak of oil discoveries. 
However, this discrepancy could be explained by the fact that the synthetic control does not replicate 
the country in the pre- event period. Indeed, the RMSPE is equal to 2.107 for democracy. Colombia 
seems to have a significant, negative outcome gap, but only 14 years after the event. In addition, in this 
case, the RMSPE is high. This difference vanishes considering participation for which the RMSPE is 
lower.18 Another exception is Mexico for which the effect of oil discoveries is negative and significant 
for both democracy and competition. The negative gap starts to decrease 5 years after the peak. 
Overall, the peak of oil discoveries, at the very least, delayed democratization in Mexico.
Second, we evaluate to what extent our results are driven by any particular control country. 
Following Abadie et al. (2015), we iteratively re- estimate the baseline model to construct the synthetic 
outcomes omitting in each iteration one of the countries that received a positive weight (leave- one- out 
synthetic control). As shown in Figure 3, this sensitivity test confirms that the results presented in the 
previous section are fairly robust to changes in the composition of the control group, although there 
are a few remarkable exceptions.19 One of these is Brazil for which we obtain a shorter negative effect, 
when the Democratic Republic of Congo is excluded, or even a positive effect when Portugal is ex-
cluded. Omitting one of Mauritania, Singapore, or Swaziland from the control group, the level of de-
mocracy of Gabon would have been lower than that of the synthetic control, despite its political 
reforms. On the contrary, Mexico's outcome would have been usually above that of the synthetic 
control excluding the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, the (negative) effect on democracy in 
Tunisia would have been much higher if Jordan was not in the control group.
Finally, we assume that the countries in our sample are treated in the year of the first oil field dis-
covery. As we state in the introduction, our intuition is that, after the peak of oil discoveries, incum-
bents may weaken political institutions in order to grab oil resources which are potentially decreasing. 
However, political actors may start reducing the level of democracy right after the first oil discovery, 
which constitutes news about future wealth increases. To check this hypothesis, we re- estimate the 
synthetic control considering the year of the first giant oil discovery as the start of the treatment pe-
riod. Following Arezki et al. (2017), we use data from Horn (2014). Owing to data availability, we 
manage to conduct this exercise for six countries only, as shown in Figure 4. In Brazil, the level of 
17The same cannot be said of participation. However, a low value of the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) was not 
obtained in most cases, as proven by the difference between the treated units and the synthetic controls at t0. 
18RMSPE is 1.001 for democracy, 5.287 for competition, and 0.395 for participation. 
19It is worth saying that the leave- one- out procedure entails a lower fit between the treated and the synthetic unit in the pre- event 
period. Thus, the divergence from baseline results may be explained by the reduced ability of the algorithm to match the pre- 
event outcome of our case studies. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   | 25MASI And RICCIUTI
democracy starts decreasing 2 years before the first discovery, and it remains constant after this event 
up to the eve of the peak when it begins to increase. The peak of discoveries seems to arrest that im-
provement in the quality of political institutions, and it takes 10 years to reach the same level of de-
mocracy of the synthetic control, as shown in the previous analysis. The first discovery does not 
change the quality of political institutions in the Republic of Congo. Indeed, the outcome variable is 
constant for 9 years after the event, but the fact that its path of democracy does not match the synthetic 
control makes the comparison between the two not reliable. In India and Viet Nam, the counterparts 
exceed the actual outcomes after the peak of oil discoveries only, although the negative gap is not 
significant in the former case, as previously shown. Considering the first discovery does not alter our 
conclusions in the case of Sudan and Tunisia.20
7 |  CONCLUSIONS
This paper undertakes a case- study analysis to evaluate the effect of a variation in oil endowment on 
political regimes. To identify a plausible exogenous shock, we exploit the timing of the peak of oil 
discoveries, that is the year after which the rate of oil discoveries starts to decrease. Relying on Tsui 
(2011), we argue that, by considering this event as the main variable related to the resource curse, we 
can address methodological concerns raised by previous studies. Furthermore, we uncover the hetero-
geneity of country conditions before and after a resource shock, and we provide an evaluation of the 
20Note that in Sudan the year of the first discovery coincides with the peak year. 
F I G U R E  3  Leave- One- Out distribution of the synthetic controls
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dynamics of the effect. To achieve these objectives, we use the SCM and estimate the democracy level 
that would have occurred in the absence of the peak of oil discoveries.
Overall, this paper confirms the idea that natural resources may be a curse or a blessing for a 
country, depending on the quality of its institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006). 
In particular, the relationship between natural resources and democracy shows some non- linearities 
depending on the initial level of democracy itself. Indeed, only the democracy levels of India and 
Colombia, that have polity2 scores above eight before the peak of discoveries, do not change sig-
nificantly after the event. All other countries, Gabon in which a period of political reforms took 
place after the peak of oil discoveries, were somehow negatively affected by the variation in oil 
endowment. This effect is sizable, since the level of democracy in countries that have reached the 
peak of oil discoveries is, on average, 8% lower than what would have been the case without the 
peak of oil discoveries.
A plausible explanation for these results is that, as the rate of discoveries starts to decline, incum-
bents enforce higher entry barriers to retain the remaining resources. This is prevented in democracies 
with higher levels of executive constraints. Further studies should investigate whether this is the true 
mechanism that explains our findings.
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